A well-confirmed observation—that there is a basic tendency to discount future reward in a hyperbolic curve {Hyperbolic delay discounting}—suggests answers to several questions that have been persistently puzzling, or, in some cases, answered prematurely:
Picoeconomics (micro-microeconomics) proposes a model that is coherent and parsimonious, but only partially tested.
[Root]
People seek reward. Reward following a mental process is what selects that process to get repeated. We evolved to seek reward, not adaptiveness or realism directly. [BBS McKay-- Non-instrumental: “It is certainly true”]
Hyperbolic delay discounting. The selecting power of a reward* is inversely proportional to its expected delay. A graph with delay on the x axis and selecting power on the y axis forms a hyperbola. [EconMod: “In a seemingly unrelated”]
Reward is a unitary phenomenon. Although different parts of the brain seem to specialize in evaluating rewards at different time ranges of delays, the evaluations are consistent among parts, and consistent with hyperbolic discount curves. [HypVCondRoss: “valuation clearly takes… await better data”]
Discounting research.
The internal marketplace of reward. Alternative mental processes (some leading to behaviors) compete on the basis of expected, discounted* reward. [OxfordMacGuffin: “The neural mechanics”]
Interests. The mental processes that are learned because they get a particular reward constitute its interest—just like an economic interest in an external marketplace. Only interests that are dominant at different times stay distinct from each other. [Breakdown: “This lability of preference]
Impulsiveness. We tend to prefer smaller, sooner (SS) rewards to larger, later (LL) rewards temporarily, when the SS rewards are imminent. Long term interests* can’t eliminate a short term interests if its SS rewards are sometimes dominant. [
[Branch from Impulsiveness]
Impulse Control Short summary: [Hansson: Recursive self-prediction provides…]
Unpredictability of future choices. Our basic tendency to impulsiveness means we can’t be sure what we will choose in the future. [
Commitment. A long term interest can forestall future impulses by arranging for physical or social forces, by restricting attention, or by arousing a contrary emotion. [Pico Commitment Passage] Without commitment in advance, control of a current impulse depends on willpower*, hypothesized to come from intertemporal bargaining*. [
Intertemporal bargaining. If you realize that your current choice is a test case for how you can expect yourself to make similar choices in the future, this perception sets up a variant of repeated prisoner’s dilemma among the successive times you make this choice. Your relationship to yourself in the future is one of limited warfare, leading to recursive self-prediction, [ ] which is the basis of both willpower* and freedom of will,* [Selectionist model: Will as intertemporal bargaining] and, conversely, sudden surges of temptation {Sudden appetites are positive…}
Willpower. The many properties of what is called willpower are modeled well by intertemporal bargains, many of them tacit, among successive choice-makers, but modeled poorly by alternative theories such as the diversion of attention, a muscle-like organ, or one’s insight about broader patterns of choice. [Eyes open: IV. Evidence about the mechanism]
The force of symbols. The “symbolic value” of a choice can be understood as the way it defines the category of choices for which it is to be a test case in intertemporal bargaining. Suddenly perceiving your current choice to be a symbol or example of a larger category can lead to radical changes of preference. [Reply to Miller: “We do not share… not a mere metaphor”]
Bright lines. Intertemporal contracts are self-enforcing, but are apt to be unstable unless they draw a line between cooperation and defection that stands out from other possible lines. Such bright lines, like the one between any smoking and none, deter you from proposing new terms for a contract when temptation is high. [ ]
Willpower may not be deliberate. You inevitably bargain with yourself whenever you notice that some aspects of your current choice situation will occur again. The process won’t usually take the form of an actual resolution, and is apt to seem nonsensical if you think you are a consistent choice-maker and know your own mind.[PennResponsibility: “it might seem incredible… 133-142)”]
Willpower is new in evolution. Nonhumans can imagine no more than a few hours of future, and must rely on instincts to motivate long term projects such as hoarding, migrating, defending territory, etc. People whose foresight makes them realize they are endangered by impulses have had to learn commitment as best they can, the most effective means being intertemporal bargaining. [Hansson: “Hyperbolic discounting raises the obvious… Sugden, 2001)”]
Willpower has serious side effects. The incentives created by seeing your current choices as test cases make it harder to live in the here-and-now. These incentives may also lead to areas like phobias where your will gives up, blind spots where you avoid noticing lapses (repression and denial), and a giving up of richer option that don’t obviously fit in with a rule (compulsiveness*). [Dangers of willpower: 2. Willpower is an awkward expedient]
[Branch from bright lines]
Freedom of will. Recursive self-prediction* makes even your imminent choices unpredictable from a knowledge of your prior incentives, even by you. This unpredictability, and the genuine participation in your choice that recursive self-prediction represents, fulfill the usual philosophical requirements for having free will. [Free will as recursive: The experience of free will: unpredicdtability and initiative]
Moral responsibility. A deterministic chain of prior causes is often said to excuse you from blame, but self-blame from breaking an intertemporal bargain* comes directly from your reduced expectations of long term reward. Perhaps social blame is vicarious self-blame—“if I were in her place I would blame myself”—and thus also compatible with strict determinism. [Free will as recursive: The experience of free will: responsibility …”marketplace model of decision-making.”]
Self as population. As interests* learn to get their rewards, they come to include intertemporal bargaining* and commitment* processes that forestall competing interests that will be dominant at different times. [Breakdown: 3.1] The interaction of these processes builds ego functions—a self—from the bottom up, without any overarching government. [HypvCondMaddenSend: Top Down and Bottom Up Theories]
Ego functions grow as foresight increases. Processes that learn to “get the jump on” other processes can steer the train of choice toward or away from them, but can remain in control only through the rewarding power of the chosen processes. [Motivation/momentary: Higher mental processes… “an incentive for such a process;” add figures with lily pads, explain ]
Self as virtual. We think of our inner selves (and our gods) as body-like or at least organ-like, but instead we consist of the relationship of motivational forces. It is true that the brain generates these forces, but the foci of these forces—both the choosing self and the chosen objects—are built from our expectations via our histories. [No link as yet]